Monthly Archives: September 2016

New stadium update: ‘More or less’ on time and budget, 500 White Hart Lane, the NFL gamble explained, and more

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Given the recent flurry of news and public comments, it is high time for another update on where things stand with the Spurs stadium project.

In recent weeks, the installation of dozens of giant “rakers” have started to finally give the structure that unique stadium shape, while along the High Road the stadium is starting to rise up high above the hoardings.

In this post, I’ll talk timelines, the NFL, training centres, housing and various other things. My last stadium update, from June, is here.

Timeline and costs

The regular board-to-board meetings between the club and the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust have proven useful in gaining insight into the state of the project.

Per the minutes of the last meeting, released on Friday, Daniel Levy confirmed that the project is “more or less” on time and budget.

Crews are working seven days a week, with the aim of being ready to move out in the summer and ensure that only one year away at Wembley is needed.

Cost-wise, “the financial model is in good shape”, Levy said, but he noted the impact of the weakened pound and 7-day work schedule. “All possible resources” were being put into construction to ensure deadlines were met, Levy said, a hint the project is currently at the higher end of its budget.

What does “all possible resources” mean, in practice, beyond extending the hours worked on site to the permitted maximum?

Earlier this month, industry website Building.co.uk published a story stating that Spurs had purchased the five cranes that are being used on the site, as they were unable to hire any when required. Obviously the increased cost of purchasing cranes, rather than waiting for rented cranes to come available, was something the club was prepared to bear in order to ensure deadlines were met.

Given the fact that crews are on site seven days a week, and are even working during matchdays when there are 32,000 fans in the vicinity, it is safe to assume the pace of work is at the absolute maximum, and there is little to no leeway for delay.

Less positive are “considerable” delays to the rebuilding of White Hart Lane station, as well as Haringey’s High Road West regeneration plan. I’m not immediately clear what impact this will have on the club and matchgoing fans when the new stadium opens. Presumably insufficient public transport capacity may require some alternative arrangements on matchdays to ensure safety, but I am speculating. I’d welcome any insight on this.

The NFL explained

Earlier this month, ESPN published the rarest of things: a Daniel Levy interview.

It was fascinating as finally, among other things, Levy’s rationale for building a stadium with NFL facilities was revealed.

Previously, I’ve had fun trying to divine what the rationale may be, but now we know — there is no clear commitment from the NFL, just a considered gamble from Spurs that ultimately, when the NFL is ready for a London franchise, the league will select New White Hart Lane as its home.

“If it ever got to a stage where the NFL decided it wanted to have a permanent team in London, this stadium could literally be, whatever the team was, it would be their stadium as opposed to an NFL team feeling they’re renting Tottenham’s stadium.

“We would welcome very much close cooperation with the NFL and a dedicated team. Obviously a decision is entirely theirs whether they do bring a team to the UK, and where it would be located is something that would be talked about. But yes, we would be very much welcome to that scenario.

“Clearly we wouldn’t both be putting all this into this stadium if there wasn’t the prospect of one day a team eventually coming to London. But there are certainly no guarantees that A) a team comes to London, and B) they have to use our stadium. I think we’re all putting the effort in in the hopes that they will do it.”

Of course, there may be more to the 10-year, two-game agreement that can be currently disclosed, but these comments are the clearest indication of the state of affairs so far.

As far as I have seen, there have been no new comments from senior NFL figures since my last piece on the subject of a permanent London franchise. New London mayor Sadiq Khan expressed support for the idea after a trip to the US, where his meetings included one with Shahid Khan, the owner of the Jacksonville Jaguars, widely seen as the most likely franchise to relocate.

However, Spurs are finding other ways to make themselves useful to the NFL.

In subsequent excerpts of the interview, Levy essentially pitched the club’s services in providing training facilities for the NFL should a team be relocated.

“The NFL, a number of times when they’ve come to the UK, has used our training facility and, when a foreign organisation goes to another territory, I think being in partnership with a local operator brings enormous benefits.

“We’re going into this, hopefully the intention is our relationship will expand over time and we’re working very closely together. But I think in terms of training facilities and things like that, we have discussed that with the NFL, but again that’s something for the NFL to decide upon.”

The training facility of a London NFL team will be one of the knottiest issues for the NFL. It’s not like in most US cities where facilities can be thrown up very quickly — in London, it takes years to acquire land and gain consent. Spurs have a huge training facility, and there may be ways of reconfiguring what is there for NFL use, or even expanding slightly such has been done with the new player accommodation. See this thread for more details:

Spurs have a chance to make themselves very useful to the NFL here, and are smart to exploit this angle. It should be noted, NFL commissioner Roger Goodell visited the facility last autumn so will know just how impressive it is.

One final thought: this was a great interview, and Daniel Levy should do more.

I’m not saying he should take to tweeting like an idiot or start Kardashianizing himself like Jose Mourinho, but rather in a targeted way, get out there a little bit.

Raising the profile of the club now may have benefits in the search for stadium sponsors. So go and have “Lunch with the FT”, talk to AdWeek, get Gary Lineker around for some multi-channel PR schmoozefest as he does so effectively with his Goal Hanger productions.

The football media narrative is stuck on Jose, Jose and more Jose, with an occasional bout of Klopp-itis or Pep-worship. Mauricio Pochettino, when he’s not going rogue and comparing academy prospects to Lionel Messi, is circumspect in his dealings with the media and his English is still limited in terms of expressing himself fully.

There’s a great story to tell about Spurs at the moment, and it’s not really being told, in my opinion.

The club is producing more homegrown talent than anyone and is the major contributor of English players to the national team. It is building a world-class stadium without any assistance from the taxpayer. In general terms, the club is punching wildly above its weight in on-field performance, as the recent Manchester United financial statement highlighted.

If ever there was a time to talk about Spurs, it’s now.

Pictures — then and now

Construction is advancing rapidly, but what is it going to look like come the final farewell to old White Hart Lane in May next year?

I first saw this picture posted by @HotspurSam, and it is well worth showing again. It’s just an impression, but you can see how progress will need to be seriously rapid over the next seven to eight months. The picture in the top-right corner is the most eye-grabbing — that’s what we should see in May.

stadiumprogression

As I’ve said previously, it is going to look absolutely bizarre.

On the subject of progress, here are a couple of photos. The first is from June 2015, and the second is the latest aerial shot from the club (with blue lines and tint, but you get the picture).

stadiumjune15stadiumsept23

Pretty cool, huh?

The other White Hart Lane development

On September 12, Spurs received approval for its 500 White Hart Lane development, subject to a Section 106 agreement.

The industrial site was bought for the relocation of Archway Sheet Metal, but they did not take up the offer and ultimately moved elsewhere. The club then marketed the site to other occupants, unsuccessfully, before deciding to turn it into housing. It is a major project, with 144 residential units and (some) retail space.

The vote by the Haringey planning sub-committee was a close one — a motion to reject the proposal was lost by five votes to six, and then the project was approved by six votes to four with one abstention. There was noisy opposition to the project, per video of the event.

This is an interesting project in so much as Spurs are doing it at all. After Archway opted against taking the site, the easiest thing to do would have been to sell it on (no doubt at a nice profit given ever-rising land values in London). But, clearly, Spurs have a taste for property development and opted for the more ambitious option.

What Spurs do with 500 White Hart Lane — develop it themselves, or sell on a consented scheme to another developer — may offer hints for what will happen to the final stage of the stadium project.

Once the stadium itself is completed in (hopefully) the summer of 2018, attention will turn to the “Southern Development Land”. This in itself is a huge development, including a 180-room hotel, 585 housing units and other facilities.

While the stadium itself will cost around £500 million, this final phase will take the bill for the project to the £675m-£750 million figure. It is a huge challenge, and the general assumption is that Spurs will ultimately sell this off as a consented scheme and allow someone else to take the risk on it. It may not be that easy, though, as the scheme has a low “internal rate of return” — a measure of the appeal of a potential development to investors.

Either way, it’s one to keep an eye on — the focus at the club now will be firmly on getting the stadium done on time.

Until a decision is made, I am going to keep using the £675m-£750 million figure for the project. Ultimately, the hotel and housing has to be built, and currently the obligation to do so lies with the club.

And finally

I’ve written a couple of pieces recently related to the stadium — this one on naming rights, and this one on the challenge of balancing spending between the stadium and the team.

Do have a read if you’ve not already done so — they are detailed pieces, and should be of interest to those following this project.

Meanwhile, over at Chelsea, the club is now in a second period of public consultation due to changes to its plan to redevelop Stamford Bridge.

There’s a Twitter thread here with various links.

I wrote in May that this second consultation would be required — so I’m pleased that what I reported proved to be accurate.

However, from my initial reading of Chelsea’s changes, I’m not entirely clear how the concerns raised by Network Rail about safety and access to the railway that will run under the West Stand have been assuaged.

Any journalists or bloggers interested in a story could do far worse than give Network Rail a call — this stadium simply won’t be built until they sign off, and they were far from happy with the initial plans. My blogging time is limited now so I can’t follow this project as closely as I have done previously.

Thanks for reading, please follow me on Twitter for more stadium chat. Comments welcome, in particular on issues concerning delays to public infrastructure and the plans for the Southern Development Land.

Naming rights and wrongs: Tottenham begin the search for stadium sponsorship deals

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Earlier this month, Spurs began the process of securing sponsorship for the new stadium. The deals struck in this phase will form a key pillar of the project’s funding strategy, and also come to define how fans see and discuss the team’s new home when it opens before the 2018/19 season.

Per reports, the club, or those acting on behalf of the club, will be approaching around 300 entities ranging from multinational corporations to government investment funds in the course of the tender.

The figures being talked about vary from report to report. While the Standard stated the club was seeking £400 million over an unspecified period, The Times reported that the club was scaling back its ambitions and was seeking £150 million for the core naming rights over ten years.

These wildly divergent figures can be confusing, and in this post I want to clarify where things currently stand. Spurs going to market has created plenty of chatter, and we can expect more stories in the weeks to come.

The key agreement will be for the naming rights to the stadium, and this will attract most of the headlines. But in addition, there are a myriad of other sponsorship possibilities available, ranging from ticket booths to corporate suites and fun elements of the project like the Sky Walk.

These will have, in the most part, been designed into the stadium by the club and the architects, Populous. This graphic by Adweek on the Levi’s Stadium in San Jose, home to the NFL’s 49ers, shows how it can be done.

Obviously, excessive commercialisation will appear tacky, but I think most fans can accept the need for at least some sponsorship. Ultimately, £675m-£750 million will have to be found from somewhere, and you can pick your poison — whether that be naming rights, public funds, selling players, high ticket prices, massive debt or ownership largesse.

The club has made clear, from the outset, that it will seek a naming rights sponsor. However, in its financial modelling for the project, this will have been one of the hardest aspects to gauge. Simply put, there are few comparable projects which means establishing a “market” value will be hard.

The Standard report referenced Manchester City’s £400m, 10-year deal with Etihad as the ambition for Spurs, but this is wildly optimistic. The Etihad deal was part of a concerted, and unsuccesful, effort to dodge Financial Fair Play regulations, and did not in any way reflect the market value of the rights to the old City of Manchester stadium.

More relevant to Spurs is Arsenal’s deal with Emirates. Under a 2012 agreement, Arsenal received £150 million from the airline, which covered shirt sponsorship until 2018/19 and naming rights sponsorship until 2028. This was an increase of the initial Emirates deal from 2004, which earned Arsenal £90 million, split again between a shorter-term shirt agreement and longer-term naming rights deal. The Guardian estimated the naming rights in this agreement at just £2.4 million per year.

If Manchester City’s deal is inflated, Arsenal’s is widely seen as undervalued. I’d add, we’ve gone through a spike in shirt sponsorship in recent years which makes the Emirates deal look poor for Arsenal, but it probably wasn’t so bad when it was signed.

After Arsenal and Manchester City, there are few comparisons in the UK. A sponsorship agreement has not yet been reached for the Olympic Stadium, while Chelsea are still mired in the planning process for their new stadium. Liverpool failed to secure a sponsor for the new stand at Anfield — but it was only a stand, not the whole naming rights package.

Generally you have to look across the Atlantic for other potential comparisons. Here are the top 10 naming rights deals for US stadia. The data is from Forbes, and I’ve added the annual value.

naming-rights-us

As you can see, there is nothing that comes close to the £40m per year that Manchester City have from Etihad, while only two deals break the annual $20m mark.

But the comparison only goes so far. If you look at the sponsors, most are companies or brands with a local connection — eg U.S. Bank in Minnesota. This reflects the introspective nature of US sport — the NFL and MLB don’t have nearly the same global audience as the Premier League.

And while we’re on the subject of the NFL, Spurs are in unchartered territory by building the first combined Premier League/NFL stadium. Spurs will, I’m sure, leverage this in its negotiations and it will enable the club to pitch the stadium as a truly global offering. But what is it really worth? Spurs will be offering just two games a year initially and no clear connection to an NFL franchise, which may limit the extent to which Spurs can monetize this aspect.

Ultimately, there are few good comparisons for what Spurs are offering, meaning it is hard to estimate what a “fair” market price would be. There may be a company out there that sees the stadium as a perfect vehicle for its global ambitions, but there may not be. If not, Spurs will be forced to readjust. There are no guarantees, no matter what the marketing gurus — a ceaselessly optimistic species — claim.

The piece in The Times by Matt Hughes hinted that a degree of realism was starting to sink in, with the initial £25 million per year target being reduced to £15 million. No doubt, this would be somewhat disappointing to the club, but as I’ve said previously, this will have been a hard part of the funding strategy to model.

(For what it’s worth, I would expect Spurs to borrow against future naming rights income — this will enable more money to be piled into the project through the construction phase, at a cost of commercial revenues received later on. Likewise for “debentures” — long-term options for corporate seats and even ordinary season tickets, an approach also used by Arsenal when funding the Emirates. We’ll have to wait for future accounts to know if this has actually taken place or not, but it isn’t unreasonable to speculate here.)

In the Viability Report for the scheme, Spurs identified the amount of additional commercial income expected from the stadium as being approximately £30m.

“Key drivers of commercial revenue growth in the new stadium are expected to be stadium and cornerstone naming rights, and income in respect of increased merchandising and conference events, which together will give annual incremental income of approximately £30 million per year.”

Ultimately, Spurs will be looking to land a naming rights package that is greater than that achieved by Arsenal. A £15 million per year package would put Spurs in the right sort of territory, with a further £15 million per year to be raised from other sponsorship opportunities and an increase in stadium-related commercial activities in order to hit that £30 million target. It seems feasible to me.

While it may be disappointing not to smash through the £20 million mark, we’ve shown in recent days that we have other ways of setting records. Certainly, any potential sponsors watching on Wednesday night will have been left in no doubt about the potential Spurs have as a club and partner.

 

A couple of other points by way of post-script.

On Nike

Whenever the subject of naming rights comes up on my Twitter timeline, I get someone saying “Duh, it’s already agreed with Nike”. There was some ITK to that effect a while ago, and it has stuck. The news last week that the rights have just gone to tender prove that this ITK was wrong. If Spurs had a naming rights deal with Nike, it wouldn’t be going to tender.

My guess is that chatter about kit supplier negotiations got confused with naming rights negotiations. Or someone just made it up.

Of course, it may end up being Nike — I’m sure they are being asked — but it would be a surprising move by the company, as it has shown little interest in being a stadium naming rights partner. It focuses on athletes and teams, not buildings. There is a Nike stadium in England already though — the John Nike athletics stadium in Bracknell.

From what I’ve read, Nike will be the next Spurs kit supplier, replacing Under Armour. But the fact that Nike immediately went out and offered Chelsea more than double what they’d just agreed to pay Spurs hardly suggests the start of a close and wide-ranging partnership. I just hope Spurs put a break clause in it and play this market far more aggressively in future. There’s no value in loyalty, and if you’re excited by what Nike will do for Spurs kit design, just look at the England shirts. Eesh.

On Qatar

Both The Times and the Standard reported that Qatar Sports Investments, the owners of PSG and a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority, the emirate’s sovereign wealth fund, were amongst the many hundred entities being approached over sponsorship. Per The Times, these talks have “intensified” amid reports Qatar Airways may not renew its relationship with Barcelona.

This caused some disquiet among Spurs fans, to put it mildly. On my timeline, I had people complain about human rights, labour practices and Qatar’s support for terrorist organisations. Charmingly, one person countered by accusing those making reasonable criticisms of “100% zionism”. A taste of what is in store, no doubt.

As The Times pointed out in a very reasonable way (and shoddy, theft-based sites such as 101greatgoals and HITC highlighted in distasteful, garbage-click-inducing ways), there is also the question of the club’s Jewish heritage.

I won’t go into all the arguments here. If you want to read more about this subject, I’d highly recommend A People’s History of Tottenham Hotspur by Martin Cloake and Alan Fisher. It offers a detailed and nuanced explanation of the club’s Jewish roots and current image as “the Jewish club”.

But three points:

First, chants of “Yid Army” in the “Qatar Airways Stadium” would appear problematic, for a variety of reasons. The club and QSI will be aware of this.

Second, Spurs will absolutely want Qatar in the conversation when negotiating with other entities as it will drive up the price. Qatar basically has a blank cheque at the moment as it prepares for the 2022 World Cup, and that’s useful to Spurs right now.

Third, I was curious about fan views on this, and did a quick Twitter poll before publishing this piece. The final result was as follows:

So out of nearly 600 votes, not a disastrous sample size, a third said they were unhappy with a Qatar Airways deal, while two thirds were either fine with it or not bothered either way. This surprised me slightly as I thought most would be against it. There were certainly some very strong opinions against Qatar, but these views weren’t the majority.

My personal view is that I’m not wild about Qatar Airways being the sponsor, and would rather someone else. But I’m also a deeply cynical person and I know that my irrational love for all things Spurs will ultimately trump my dislike for Qatar. A bit like before the Olympics when I swore I’d not watch following the IOC’s cowardly surrender to Russia over doping, and then watched every moment as Team GB’s gold rush hit full speed. I’m terrible, I know.

Who’s it gonna be?

I often get asked who I think the stadium sponsor will be. I normally reply “I have no idea”, as I don’t have any particular knowledge. But it’s a fun guessing game, so let’s play it.

I think Qatar Airways is a strong possibility, as they’ve got loads of money and surely want to keep up with their competitor Middle Eastern airlines in the global branding race.

Also high on the list will be companies in the financial services sector. Just like Nike prefer athletes and teams, banks and insurers like sponsoring solid, long-term things like stadiums. It just kinda fits the image.

You can bet that Barclays, previously the name sponsor for the Premier League and with a marketing budget that needs spending, will be getting a call. Barclays sponsors the new NBA arena in Brooklyn, and may have an interest in the NFL aspect as it seeks to develop its brand in the US.

I’m sure almost every major global insurance company will be approached too. Two major recent deals in the US — the MetLife Stadium and SunTrust Stadium — have been with insurers. Current shirt sponsors AIA may have an interest.

(German insurer Allianz had attempted to sponsor the new NFL stadium in New York several years ago, but ran into trouble with the local Jewish community due to its war-time connections with the Nazi regime. MetLife swooped in at a lower price after Allianz withdrew.)

The one other possibility that has sprung to mind is EE. The mobile network is owned by the BT Group, which is pushing aggressively into the sporting rights market and sees synergies everywhere. BT is sitting on a gold mine as it owns most of the UK’s broadband infrastructure, and has so far avoided being broken up by regulators. EE has shown interest in this sort of deal through its agreement with Wembley.

I’m throwing out names — 300 entities are being approached, so it may take some time. Ultimately, it’ll be who it’ll be.

Some of us will be OK with it, others will hate it; most of us will get used to it, others will want to keep on calling it White Hart Lane. We’re fans, we get to be like that.

For the club, the most important thing is building a new stadium, and the naming rights is a key part of ensuring that the money is in place to do that. “How much” will trump “who”, within reason.

Thanks for reading. Please follow me on Twitter for more Spurs chat.

The balancing act: Can Spurs find a way to remain competitive through the stadium construction phase?

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If it didn’t already feel real, the sight of the new stadium starting to rise up from the ground illustrates that a new era is finally dawning on Spurs. The next five years promise to be one of the most exciting, and most risky, periods in the club’s history.

Spurs are borrowing at least £350 million from banks, plus securitising future commercial and matchday revenues, in order to fund the stadium project and associated development.

The debt load will surpass what Arsenal took on to build the Emirates a decade ago, and will only be topped by Manchester United, who last year paid around £35 million in financing and £15 million in dividend payments for the privilege of being owned by the Glazer family.

Having spent a decade wading through the planning process and acquiring the land, now the club has the challenge of delivering a 61,000-seater stadium in a densely populated part of London on a tight timeframe, and to budget.

Things appear to be on track at this early stage, but an extraordinarily challenging few years await. The reward is clear though — New White Hart Lane promises to be a world-class stadium, and a true sporting cathedral that is everything the dreary Olympic Stadium will never be.

I have previously written about the stadium financing issue in great detail. In this post, I am going to take a look at the broader state of the club’s finances, and the challenges that lie ahead through the stadium construction phase.

Moving away from pragmatic player trading

A look through the recent financial history of Spurs reveals a number of distinct eras, layered on top of each other like sedimentary rock.

From 2001 to 2007, you have the “Early ENIC” years, in which Daniel Levy inherited the mess from Alan Sugar and piled on more mess as he tried to get to grips with the intricacies of Premier League chairmanship.

From around 2007, the “Wheeler Dealer” era truly began. This was a period of frenzied transfer activity that gradually pushed Spurs from mid-table to the fringes of Champions League contention, but without any sense of stability or sustainability beyond the confidence that more bargains would be found, and more mega fees extracted. This era came to a shuddering halt with the failure of the Bale money splurge, and the realisation that Spurs were never going to be able to compete with the moneybags elite when needing to sell as well as buy.

Since 2014, a new era has emerged, with a more prudent approach to player trading and a greater focus on cost controls. How much this is connected to the stadium funding, or the arrival of Mauricio Pochettino, is unclear. Certainly, you suspect Andre Villas-Boas was supposed to be ambitious young manager to lead Spurs through the tricky stadium construction phase, but there was a problem with a beanie hat and not everything works out.

Pochettino has made a virtue out of having a young, hungry and therefore relatively cheap squad, and the narrow band into which most of the player salaries reportedly fall is seen as a contributing factor to squad unity. Likewise, the club has had the incentive to ensure its accounts are glistening as it struck agreements on financing — a little money saved now could mean a lower rate of interest on the £350 million stadium loan.

Tottenham has been a consistently profitable club in the past decade, but has been reliant on player trading (profit on disposal of intangible assets, as it is known) to achieve this, as the following chart shows:

ProfitandTrading

In the past decade, the club is £152 million in profit. However, in that time, accounting profit on player trading is £295 million — without player trading, the club would have theoretically lost £143 million. Of course it’s not nearly that simple, but it illustrates the degree that Spurs have needed to sell in order to buy.

When Levy referred to “pragmatic player trading” in the club’s rather panicky statement to reassure disgruntled fans in September 2015, it didn’t sound right to me due to the suggestion of a continuation of the “buy low, sell high” era that had already started to pass. “Prudent player trading” would have been a better phrase — no need to sell players the manager wants to keep, but limits on what can be spent and a more cautious approach to acquisitions.

What the stadium financing phase needs is as great a degree of stability as is possible in the anarchic environment of Premier League football. Player trading is the biggest uncertainty of them all in football’s financial landscape. Now that Pochettino has cleared out the flotsam inherited from the Franco Baldini era, fans can expect the “churn” to reduce in transfer windows to come.

Cost controls in action

If you read any analysis of THFC finances from recent years, you’ll see some variant on the following phrase: “Daniel Levy runs a tight ship”.

There are many stories of these cost controls in action — my personal favourite was Mido being told to run across the tarmac to ensure he got a seat with extra legroom on a budget airline flight to London after being bought from Roma.

For a couple of months a year, this gets frustrating. The club’s approach to transfers is akin to dental surgery — deals are done painfully and slowly. Contract negotiations seem to drag on endlessly, key targets are missed, players leaving the club are left in limbo while the market is scoured for someone desperate enough to pay the premium.

Part of this, undoubtedly, is personality driven, and there appears a genuine relish in tough negotiations and brinkmanship. But part of this is necessity — with matchday revenues at their limit, and the club unable for various reasons to match the commercial growth of the richer clubs, it has become increasingly important to find value in the transfer market and control player costs with the stadium financing ahead.

I want to illustrate “where the money goes” at Spurs, and demonstrate what these cost controls actually look like.
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I’ve gathered data from the past 10 years for revenue and the two major outgoings, namely wages and transfer spend.

(For transfer spend I will use the figure for amortisation. Amortisation is an accounting method whereby the cost of buying players is spread over the lengths of their contracts. There’s an explanation at the bottom of this piece, but essentially amortisation is an annual figure that shows how much the club is actually spending on transfers. The advantage of this is that, while most transfer fees are undisclosed, the amortisation figure is listed in the accounts.)

Here is a chart:

RevWageandAmort

This gives you a picture of how revenue and wages are rising, but transfer spending has actually been quite flat.

However, if you combine wages and amortisation, something interesting happens:

RevWplusA

As you can see, wages plus amortisation tracks revenue remarkably closely from 2007-2014, to the point that it is almost a mirror. It is only in 2010 (financial year) when the gap becomes close. You can see the balance-sheet management in play to ensure spending remained at the desired level.

Why am I so confidently proclaiming a new financial era? Look at 2014. For the first time, revenue starts to diverge, and there is every indication that the divergence will grow starker over the next two financial years.

In the next accounts, the following senior players will come off the books, or be added:

OUT: Paulinho, Holtby, Capoue, Kaboul, Stambouli, Chirches, Soldado, Lennon, Adebayor.

IN: Wimmer, Trippier, N’Jie, Alderweireld, Son,

While there have also been a number of new contracts, and there are hints some of Adebayor’s contract pay-off may have been factored into the 2015 accounts, in all likelihood the wage bill is going to be level or even lower in the 2016 accounts. Meanwhile, the strong league performance means TV money will increase. In the 2017 accounts, we’ll have both the new Premier League TV deal kicking in, and Champions League revenue, to counterbalance a series of new contracts and the signings made in the past window.

My prediction is that revenue and first-team spending will continue to diverge in the next two years. This puts Spurs in opposition to most other Premier League clubs, which are frantically offloading the new TV money on transfer fees and wages as fast as it is pouring in.

As it stands, here are the combined wages and amortisation for the four clubs arguably “closest” to Spurs financially (United are on a different planet, and Chelsea and City are billionaire playthings, so a comparison isn’t worthwhile):

Arsenal — £244.1m
Liverpool — £227m
Tottenham — £139.4m
Everton — £97m
West Ham — £94.3m

In previous years, Spurs have been all alone in “sixth” place in spending on wages (among several other indicators of club “size”) — we will start to see other clubs narrowing the gap. Some may interpret this as a lack of ambition, but ultimately Spurs have a £750 million stadium scheme to fund, which seems pretty ambitious to me.

The growing gap between revenue and first-team spending means more funds that can be rolled into the stadium project. Spurs appear to be positioning themselves to absorb the spike in financing costs that is to come.

In short, since 2014 Spurs have been shifting to a more sustainable model that relies less on big transfer fees to balance the books. The emergence of home-grown stars like Harry Kane, smart acquisitions like Dele Alli and Eric Dier, and the strong management of Mauricio Pochettino have turbocharged this shift. Sometimes you need a bit of luck.

Learning from Arsenal

Over the next five years, the period of peak financing, Spurs need to strike a balance between funding stadium construction, and remaining competitive on the pitch.

Over the next two seasons in particular, the financial benefits Spurs can accrue from being competitive (Champions League money, greater share of British TV money, improved receipts from Wembley), relative to the amount of money that can be saved, justify continued investment in the playing squad. A competitive and appealing Spurs team will greatly help the club sell the increased number of tickets and long-term hospitality packages that is the rationale underpinning the whole project.

Levy has repeatedly stated that there is no need to sell players to fund the stadium, including at the last board-to-board meeting with the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters’ Trust. This isn’t just a statement of confidence in the funding package for the stadium, but also recognition of the need to ensure Spurs field a strong team on opening day of the 2018/19 season.

However, there is a difference between not needing to sell players, and having limits on what can be spent to secure new ones. The extent to which Spurs can compete for new players over the next five years will depend on how much Spurs will have to spend to finance construction. Spurs will be taking on huge debt — at least £350 million — but the key will be controlling the amount that is spent each year on interest payments and repayment of principal.

(Why do I keep saying five years? As previously reported, the £350 million loan will be a five-year loan, which will then be refinanced — per the Viability Report for the project submitted during the planning process. Until I hear otherwise, I will assume the basic funding plan is the same.)

As the only other club to have built and financed a comparable project, the best example for what lies ahead is Arsenal. I don’t want to go into too much detail as the comparison isn’t perfect, but there are a few points worth making.

Arsenal, notoriously, felt the squeeze during construction, creating a need for parsimony that some fans argue Arsene Wenger has never really shaken off. Spurs have the great advantage of learning from Arsenal’s experience. From my understanding of what I have read, Arsenal ploughed ahead without all the required funding in place, which made it more expensive and at one stage forced construction to stop. Spurs can’t afford such a delay given the tight time schedule imposed by the need to play away from White Hart Lane.

I’ve attempted to gather data for the finance costs paid out by Arsenal, to demonstrate, not so much the amounts, as the “profile” — how finance costs will peak and then reduce and flatten to a tidy annual sum. This is extremely hard — Arsenal have refinanced their debt load on several occasions, making it hard to track. The chart below gives the club’s stated figures for interest charges in the period, and debt payments due in the coming year (repayment of principal).

Arsenal raised debt for both the Ashburton Grove stadium project, and the redevelopment of Highbury — likewise, Spurs will be funding property development (on the “southern development land” on the stadium site and at 500 White Hart Lane) as well as stadium construction. I can’t be sure all the debt payments relate to stadium/property development, so take the figures with a pinch of salt. But, it is a consistent measure.

Arsenal Emirates Financing

The 2007 figure isn’t right, as I can’t find the “repayment of principal” number due to refinancing, frustratingly. But for the first four years, you can see how total financing costs were between £35m and £45m — quite a burden. From 2008, things levelled out, and Arsenal continues to spend around £19m a year on its Emirates “mortgage”.

Spurs can expect a similar profile to this. For five years, repayments and interest will be high, but then the bank loan will be refinanced into a long-term debt package at a lower rate of interest. Arsenal’s debt is split about 80-20 between fixed-rate and floating-rate bonds, at 5.8 percent and 6.6 percent interest respectively. More than any aspect of this whole project, I expect Daniel Levy to get the best possible terms on this sort of financial jiggery-pokery — he has years of experience.

We won’t know how much Spurs are spending on financing costs (I could ask, but I will get a polite note stating the commercial sensitivity of the topic, I guarantee) until the accounts covering the financing period are published — we’ll have to wait for the 2016 accounts, published in April/May of 2017. Any attempt to put a figure on it on my part would be conjecture. But it will be substantial.

One final point of comparison with Arsenal is the shift in the broader financial environment of a Premier League football club in the past decade. Here are the comparative revenues of Arsenal at the peak of Emirates financing, and Spurs last year:

ArsSpurRev

As you can see, Tottenham’s revenue is nearly £60 million higher, due to more commercial income and TV money (and that number will spike in future accounts with the new TV deal).

On the one hand, Spurs are taking on a bigger finance package — £350m versus £260m. On the other hand, Spurs are doing it from a stronger financial position — £196m revenue versus £137m.

The ability of Spurs to control financing costs and maximise revenues during the construction phase will ultimately determine the amount that is ringfenced to be spent on transfers and wages.

Capital expenditure

What shouldn’t be forgotten amid the talk of the massive new financial burden is that, for years now, Spurs have been investing heavily in both the stadium project and the training centre.

In the meeting with the THST in May this year, Daniel Levy stated that £150 million had been invested in the stadium project to date. Per the last accounts, the “cumulative” spend on the stadium (professional fees and “enabling works”) was stated to be £59 million, up from £40.9 million in the previous year. On top of that £59 million are property acquisitions, professional fees/other costs for the previous design that will have been written off, and construction costs in the six-week period between when Spurs gained the final green light and the board-to-board meeting.

As for the training centre, upon opening, it was capitalised at £27.5 million — in line with the £30 million price tag that is generally put about for the wonderful facility.

This £177.5 million capital expenditure has taken place over the past nine financial years (prior to 07/08 there was none). The average spend is about £20m per year, although of course it is far from a straight line. This investment has been funded by a combination of equity contributions, bank loans and club profits.

As an aside, I was curious to see how much money has been put in by ENIC to fund this sort of expenditure in the past decade, and how much has come from loans/profits.

This stuff gets hard to track as the club accounts are pretty complex. But from what I can make of it, in 2014 there was a £40m injection, while in 2010 there was a £15m injection plus a further £18.4m “investment in group companies”. This refers to the many subsidiaries that are mostly focused on property, so it would be reasonable to suggest this was for property purchases.

From my chats with people who know about this stuff (OK, that’ll be @ztranche), this equity contribution has been in the form of loans converted into preference shares.

The combined equity contribution is £73.4m, meaning the rest — £104 million or so — has been funded by loans and from profits. This is equity contribution is fairly modest, given the size of Joe Lewis’s Tavistock Group portfolio and the way the value of the club is going to soar once the stadium is complete. I’d compare this level of investment to adding a conservatory to your house to increase the value, rather than being a sugar daddy and sticking a helipad on the roof. But the money was found, and the investment now will help the club in years to come (and help “Uncle Joe” cash in, if and when he sells).

Overall, while not on the level of the stadium financing costs once the £350m loan kicks in, this £177.5m is not an inconsiderable amount of capital investment in the period. It will have given Spurs experience in managing its balance sheet to ensure not all the TV money is pissed away on agents and transfer fees. There is an adjustment coming, but won’t be like Spurs are accelerating from 0 to 60mph — we’ve already been cruising along at 30mph for a while now.

Final thought

The next five years is about finding the right balance between funding the stadium and funding a competitive team. It’ll be hugely challenging, and even if Spurs get it “right”, events out of the club’s control — luck, relative performance of others, macroeconomy, you name it — may mean it looks like the club got it “wrong”.

Underinvestment in the playing squad could have a negative impact on the viability of the stadium project, just as overinvestment could. It is safe to assume Spurs will be on the cautious side of this spectrum — the unofficial target of a 45 percent wages-turnover ratio hints as much.

But, building a new stadium doesn’t mean the club must put away the chequebook for a few years — in fact, the club must not. A drift back towards mid-table would be counterproductive in terms of both lost revenues, and the potential loss of Champions League calibre players that would harm the effort to sell tickets and hospitality packages in the new stadium when it opens.

I don’t want to see the club hide behind the stadium project as an excuse for not sufficiently strengthening the playing squad. The fact that Spurs were prepared to overpay on deadline day to secure a player like Moussa Sissoko shows the money is there, and the club is prepared to spend it. Likewise, continued investment in Hotspur Way through the construction of player accommodation shows the bigger picture isn’t being ignored, and the club is not being stretched beyond its limits by the stadium scheme.

The data I have gathered shows, in my opinion, that Spurs are well positioned for the huge leap that is now being taken. Years of pragmatism in the transfer market, and stringent cost controls, mean Spurs are as well prepared as they could be for the jump in stadium-related spending that is coming.

The spike in Premier League money, improvements in performance under Mauricio Pochettino and emergence of a clutch of homegrown talents are perfectly timed and give Spurs a little more leeway, arguably, than Arsenal had when building the Emirates. Of course, the Premier League TV deal has an inflationary impact on transfers and wages, which makes finding value harder.

Investing big bucks during boom years on capital projects such as training centres and stadium upgrades is exactly what a football club should be doing from a business perspective. Personally, I am very happy with what is being attempted and fully supportive. Some readers will disagree — that is your right.

For Daniel Levy, the new stadium is his vision and the defining project of his chairmanship. He has skin in the game — as the owner of a significant portion of the club, his net worth will soar if the stadium project is completed successfully.

The incentives for him to get things right are clear. But finding the right balance will be hugely challenging, and involve much guesswork. It’s going to get interesting, folks.

Thanks for reading, please follow me on Twitter for more chat. I welcome comments and criticism (preferably constructive) — I’m not an accountant or economist, so there are bound to be areas where my analysis falls short.