By Charles Richards / @spurs_report
(Update 21/04: Per ESPNFC, the £10m figure identified in this piece as a potential upfront NFL contribution to the stadium project has been confirmed. The mysterious £45m in accruals and deferred income remains in question. Answers on a postcard!)
Tottenham Hotspur’s newly published accounts for the 2016 financial year show a club in transition, still hamstrung by the constraints of White Hart Lane but moving clearly towards the altogether grander future that beckons.
Spurs chairman Daniel Levy has described the club, in its current state, as essentially two businesses — a football club, and a stadium development. This appears to be a useful mechanism for digesting the swathes of information contained in this annual insight into Tottenham’s finances.
In this analysis, I’ll focus on the football first, and then talk about the stadium. I’ll also talk about the NFL partnership — and ask whether the financial terms have finally been revealed.
The club’s statement with the key figures is here, and you can find the full accounts in the Investor Relations section of the club website. Bear in mind, the accounts cover the 2015/16 season only — they end on June 30, 2016 and anything that has happened since then will be included in next year’s edition.
ON THE PITCH
Spurs achieved something rare in 2015/16, particularly in the inflationary environment of the Premier League: the club lowered football costs and improved on-field performance.
However, if Spurs were hoping for any credit for finishing third in the Premier League on a budget dwarfed by the five wealthier clubs, this was dashed by Leicester’s remarkable title win and the limp finish.
What Spurs achieved in 2015/16 was highly impressive. While Leicester have fallen back to earth and mounted a title defence even limper than Chelsea’s in the previous season, Spurs have kicked on another gear since. There is a sustainability to what Mauricio Pochettino, Daniel Levy and others in the Spurs brainstrust have built, and that’s why the mood among Spurs fans is so positive. We see it, even if others don’t.
Once again, these accounts show Daniel Levy’s tight grip on the club’s finances. Net profit increased from £9.4m to £33.0m.
Spurs managed to reduce wages slightly, from £100.8m to £100.04m. Revenue, meanwhile, increased from £196.4m to £209.8m, an increase of 6.8%. As a result, wage to turnover ratio dropped from 51.4% to 47.4%. This continues the sharp downward trend — in FY 2014 it stood at 55.6%.
How did Spurs achieve this? A look at transfer activity and new contracts in the period shows how:
PLAYERS OUT: Paulinho, Holtby, Capoue, Kaboul, Stambouli, Chirches, Soldado, Lennon, Adebayor
PLAYERS IN: Wimmer, Trippier, N’Jie, Alderweireld, Son
NEW CONTRACTS: Dembele, Onomah (x2), Winks (x2), Alli, Dier, CCV, McGee, Pritchard, Bentaleb
Spurs managed to get rid of a lot of high earners — including a lot of flotsam from the failed Bale money splurge — while of the new signings, only Alderweireld and Son commanded “big” wages.
Meanwhile, Dembele was the only senior player to sign a new deal in the period — the rest were part of the “contract escalator” Spurs have in place for young players to increase their earnings as their role grows. Both Alli and Dier, for example, have signed new contracts in the current financial year, and will soon join the very top earners.
Crucially, with the old Premier League deal in its final season, Spurs were able to hold off on pay rises for all other senior players. This prevented “double dipping” — players seeking new contracts, then demanding another new one the next year citing soaring revenues.
Here are the players who have signed new contracts in FY 2017 so far: Lloris, Kane, Dier, Eriksen, Rose, Walker, Alli, Vertonghen, Winks, CCV, Wimmer, Carroll and Vorm.
That’s a lot of new deals — probably in the region of £15-20m of additional salary, by my estimates. But with Premier League TV income jumping by around £40m next season, it’s the perfect time to do it.
Looking at the ins and outs, you may be wondering why wages didn’t decrease further. Without transparency on player contracts, it’s hard to know — there may well have been some Champions League-related bonuses that kicked in.
Meanwhile, transfer spending ticked down. The “net spend” picture is confusing from accounts: the accounts reported a £27.1m profit from the “disposal of intangible assets”, but this isn’t a true picture of player trading.
I prefer to look at amortisation, the measure of the cost of new signings spread over the length of their contracts and reported on annual basis. A full explanation is in the notes of this story, but in the simplest way: If Spurs sign a player for £10m on a five-year contract, that equals £2m in annual amortisation cost.
For Spurs, amortisation dropped from from £38.6m to £31.8m, thanks to a large number of expensive failures leaving the club and mostly cheap replacements coming in.
If you combine wages and amortisation, you get a good measure of “real football spend” — how much clubs are actually investing in their playing squads. For Spurs, this decreased from £139.4m to £131.8m.
Here’s how Spurs compare with selected other clubs:
As you can see, not only is the gap between Spurs and the wealthier five clubs growing, the gap between Spurs and the clubs below is narrowing. Spurs, simply put, are defying gravity — and no club better demonstrates the value of homegrown talent.
Revenue was a mixed picture, and further underscored what by now barely needs stating — Spurs need a bigger stadium and new sponsorship deals.
Matchday revenue was essentially flat, down from £41.2m to £40.8m, while commercial revenue dipped from £59.9m to £58.6m. If there is one area that will disappoint, it is the latter.
Spurs are stuck in the tail-end of the Under Armour kit deal (expiring at the end of the 2016/17 season) and are midway through the AIA deal, which ends in 2018/19. With each year, these deals grow less competitive. But success on the pitch failed to boost merchandise sales (which declined slightly from £12.3m to £12.0m). Lack of Cup success also hit commercial and matchday income.
As far as I can tell, Spurs did not sign any major new sponsorship deals in FY 2016. The partnership with Kumho Tyres started in FY 2017, and certainly, just comparing the “Partners” section of the club website compared with similar sections for other clubs, and you can see that Spurs are far less active.
Does it matter, given how tacky this stuff gets? Ultimately, if Subway want to offer £2.5m a year to be official sandwich partner, that’s the easiest money a football club will ever make. There’s significant room for growth in this area.
The bulk of the revenue growth came thanks to the increase in Europa League prize money. Previously an irritation, the Europa League is far more valuable now. Prize money increased from £4.7m to £15.5m due to the largesse of BT Sport. That’s a lot of money for not very many viewers, but Spurs aren’t complaining.
Premier League revenue also increased thanks to improved on-field performance. 21 games were selected for UK broadcast, compared with 18 in the previous season — under the old TV deal, each extra selection above the minimum 10 was worth around £750,000, while performance-based prize money jumped by around £2.5m for finishing 3rd compared with 5th.
In a previous piece, I noted a development whereby revenue and spending, previously moving in concert, were starting to diverge.
As you can see, this divergence was amplified in FY 2016. I like this chart as I think it tells a story, of Spurs shifting from the “wheeler dealer” mentality to a more sustainable approach as the club enters the stadium build phase.
In the coming three years, this trend is only going to increase. Next year, Premier League revenue should increase to around £140m, while the brief Champions League campaign should bring in around £35m. In the following year, pending the official announcement, Spurs will have much higher gate receipts due to playing home games at Wembley. The financial year after that, we’ll be into the new stadium.
These are exciting times for Spurs: it feels like things are falling into place. We’ve got the right manager, the best core of players in years, and a boardroom focused — almost to the point of obsession — with delivering a world-class stadium. It’s going to be fascinating to see how we manage to screw this up.
OFF THE PITCH
Arguably the most important disclosure in the annual report concerned the stadium: the borrowing has officially started.
The first £200m portion of the bank finance Spurs have sought is in place, £100m of which was drawn as of June 2016. Interestingly, this facility was entered into on December 10 — six days before Spurs secured planning permission for the new stadium from Haringey council.
This is the “bridge” portion of the £350m loan Spurs will seek to cover a chunk of the construction costs. There has been public posturing over the finance of the project amid negotiations on public sector contributions and infrastructure delivery, but the annual report shows that financing is moving forward broadly as the club said it would in the planning process.
This £200m facility cost £855,000 in arrangement fees, but we don’t yet know the annual finance cost. The first £100m is repayable in December 2017 — or to put it another way, in December this year it will be refinanced into a bigger and longer-term facility. It may be that Spurs are able to borrow more than the planned £350m, given the increasing revenue and rising construction costs.
Overall, spending on the project has increased from £59m to £115.3m, per the club.
Meanwhile, two other unusual items, a long way down the accounts, caught my eye.
The first was a payment of exactly £10m, received from “a company, which is not a related party, as a contribution towards future construction expenses related to the Northumberland Development Project.”
Who is this money from? Public sector contributions have been a matter of contention, and do not extend to the stadium itself — certainly no agreement was reached before June 2016. If it were Tavistock Group — Uncle Joe — injecting money, it would be listed as a related party contribution.
The second, found in the non-current liabilities section, was a disclosure of £45m, again an exact amount, in “accruals and deferred income”. In 2015, the club recorded £0 in the same category, likewise in 2013 and 2014.
Deferred income is income received for services that will take place beyond the period covered in the balance sheet. Season ticket income and payments received for commercial deals that stretch beyond the reporting period are listed in the current liabilities section.
While it has been reported that Spurs have agreed a deal with Nike as the next kit supplier, this has yet to be officially announced, and certainly wasn’t announced during the previous accounting period.
So what is it?
While no major new sponsorship deals were announced during the period, there was one major new commercial partnership: the 10-year, 20-game NFL deal. If there was a payment, it would be reported in these accounts — with stadium completion date yet to be confirmed, it would be deferred income.
No financial terms were announced, but it seems likely that Spurs would seek money “up front” from the NFL to at the very least cover the additional costs of installing NFL facilities within the stadium. Likewise, expect Spurs to see at least a portion of naming rights income up front to help with cash flow when a deal is agreed, and advance ticket sales income.
A concern has grown among some Spurs fans that the NFL may be “using” Spurs, in the same way the organisation brazenly exploits local taxpayers in the USA. But, in reality, trying to gauge the additional costs incurred by the NFL elements is hard.
Once the project stalled amid the legal dispute with Archway, the stadium design was always going to be tweaked so that Spurs could get as much into the site as possible. To make it a true NFL stadium, additional work had to be carried out to basement areas, plus there was the need to reconfigure the interior to allow for enlarged locker rooms and media facilities. The sliding pitch sums up how tricky it is to put a value on the NFL additions: it is a new and expensive piece of technology that, while useful to Spurs when hosting concerts and other sporting events, feels like an extravagance too far if there were no NFL contribution.
So can we now put a price on this partnership? A one-off £10m payment, plus a 10-year, £45m hosting arrangement that has been paid up front. In total, a £55m ($69m) contribution to the £800m or so total cost.
It certainly sounds reasonable, and realistic. For the NFL, it gives them the stadium they desire in London for future growth plans. For Spurs it is money that can be used to turn the stadium into the world-class venue the club has always hankered to build.
I can’t confirm this — any journalists looking for a story could do worse than run this up the flagpole — but it certainly seems possible. Certainly, there have been suggestions that the NFL is putting money into the stadium — including recently by MMQB journalist Albert Breer.
I welcome any other suggestions on where this £10m construction cost and £45m in deferred income may have come from. But my hunch says NFL.
Away from the stadium, Spurs are continuing to invest in the training centre with construction of a new player accommodation facility. The £16m loan facility for the training centre was expanded to £25m, at a cost of £265,000.
Spurs being Spurs, there is a commercial element to this. In addition to providing accommodation for the first team and youth teams, and players visiting for medicals ahead of signing, the facility will also be used by other teams. An agreement is in place with England to use it before games at Wembley — all those times England train at Hotspur Way isn’t an ad hoc arrangement — while it is also available to European sides ahead of midweek matches against other London sides. Both Barcelona and AC Milan even provided letters of support in the planning process.
The planning agreement makes clear this isn’t a hotel, but no doubt visiting teams and England will pay handsomely for the privilege. Speculation that NFL teams may use the facility is wide of the mark — at 45-rooms, it is simply too small.
There are a couple of other lines of note.
The first is exceptional items of £9.6m in “commercial and employment contract costs”. In the previous year, £6.5m was reported in “redundancy costs and onerous employment contracts”.
My assumption was that at least a part of last year’s exceptional items referred to Emmanuel Adebayor, who at some stage stopped being a footballer. More likely any payoff was included in this set of accounts. But as for commercial costs, it is hard to understand what that may be. £9.6m out of £209.8m total revenue is not an inconsiderable sum, and I’d welcome any suggestions. If there is an inference from the new description, I’m missing it.
Second is £500,000 paid by Spurs to Melix Financial Services, another Tavistock Group company, for “commercial advice on global sponsorship opportunities”. Melix, like much of Tavistock (the investment umbrella for Joe Lewis of which Spurs is just one part), is Bahamas registered — but beyond that, there is no public profile. If you Google the name, you’ll get a few links to a late 2000s Romanian property scandal, and that’s about it.
There may be a perfectly reasonable explanation, but it beats me. Answers on a postcard – preferably with a nice picture of the Bahamas on it.
Thanks for reading. Please follow me on Twitter for more Spurs chat. Comments welcome, either below or to spursreport at gmx.co.uk.